The Structure of Expertise in Criminal Cases
Christopher Slobogin∗
This Essay is built around three propositions about expert
testimony and criminal cases.
First, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
1
2
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and its progeny, General Electric Co. v. Joiner, and
3
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, push the criminal justice system away
from the notion that knowledge is socially constructed and toward a
positivist epistemology that assumes we can know things objectively.
Second, in the long run, that development will be good for
prosecutors and bad for criminal defendants.
Third, the
consequence of that differential impact will be a criminal justice
system that is not only less fair, but also less reliable. In the course of
developing these propositions, this Essay will have occasion to
4
comment on several observations made by Denbeaux and Risinger,
the principal paper in this cluster of papers on Daubert, as well as on
several other papers presented at this Symposium.
THE POSITIVIST PUSH
There is no doubt that, in theory, the Daubert trilogy moves the
admissibility analysis in a positivist direction. The trilogy establishes
reliability as the linchpin of admissibility analysis. In contrast, the
best-known pre-Daubert approaches to expert admissibility are the
relevance test, which admits expert testimony unless its probative
value is substantially outweighed by its potential for confusing or
overawing the jury, and the general acceptance test, which looks at
the extent to which the basis of the testimony has found favor in the
∗
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relevant professional community. The Daubert trilogy mandates that
testimony be subject to verification through the scientific method or
6
some other transparent methodology, whereas the latter tests come
close to relying solely on the ipse dixit of a single individual or group,
7
so long as he, she, or it is well-credentialed.
As a result, the relevance and general acceptance tests are much
more likely than the Daubert trilogy to give legal factfinders wide8
ranging, “socially-constructed” information. Under the relevance
test, virtually all expertise is admissible, and under the general
acceptance test, all expertise that is not “novel” should get in. Under
the reliability standard, on the other hand, only verifiable
information is admissible. The first two tests are likely to admit any
expert testimony the reliability test would let in, with the possible
exception of testimony based on new, verifiable findings (which
might not be admissible under Frye but would be under the trilogy).
In contrast, the reliability test is likely to exclude a substantial amount
of expert testimony that is admissible under the relevance and
9
general acceptance tests. That means that, under the Daubert trilogy,
5

See generally Paul Giannelli, Forensic Science: Daubert in the States, 34 CRIM. L.
BULL. 154, 155-62 (1998).
6
Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Supreme Court: What Is the Problem?, 34 SETON
HALL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003) (stating that “verifiable reliability of evidence” is the
“central concern” of the trilogy).
7
See Giannelli, supra note 5, at 155 (stating that under the relevancy test, “if the
expert was qualified, the underlying technique used by that expert was also
qualified”); Paul Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1207 (1980) (“The principal
justification for the Frye test” is that it “‘assures that those most qualified to assess the
general validity of a scientific method will have the determinative voice.’”) (quoting
United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). Professor Giannelli
also notes how the general acceptance test obscures inquiry into reliability and
probative value issues. Id. at 1226-28.
8
Some commentators have argued that Daubert is more consistent with a social
constructionist view of science than the Frye test. More specifically, they contend that
while the general acceptance test (and therefore, implicitly, the relevance test)
legitimizes “elite, authoritative opinions” as “the sole arbiters of specialized
knowledge,” Daubert and Kumho Tire take a “realist-constructivist view of science.”
Joseph Sanders et al., Legal Perceptions of Science and Expert Knowledge, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB.
POL’Y & L. 139, 149-50 (2002). The latter view, Sanders and his colleagues state,
recognizes that expertise is influenced by political, economic and other non-neutral
sources, albeit in a manner that is “constrained by input from the empirical world.”
Id. at 150-51 (citing STEPHEN COLE, MAKING SCIENCE: BETWEEN NATURE AND SOCIETY x
(1992)). All that may be true, but it does not directly address Daubert’s impact in
court. In determining whether Daubert will make expertise more positivist in tone,
the focus should be on what the legal factfinder is likely to hear, not on the source of
the expert’s expertise. For reasons outlined in the text, a reliability test clearly
excludes more expert testimony than the other two tests.
9
As Denbeaux and Risinger state, “at least until what we might call the run-up
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legal factfinders will be exposed to much less “soft” science and much
10
In short, the reliability
less speculation based on experience.
standard should make the epistemology of the courtroom decidedly
more scientific, in the classic sense.
Of course, in criminal cases, the focus of this Essay, that
prediction has not been entirely borne out. Courts in Daubert
jurisdictions still admit scientifically weak expert testimony proffered
by both the prosecution and the defense. As Professors Risinger and
Denbeaux point out, suspect testimony from handwriting and
11
fingerprint experts continues unabated in many jurisdictions, and
other research indicates that the prosecution often benefits from soft
testimony about subjects such as dangerousness and the behavior of
12
child sex abuse victims. Defense experts may be somewhat more
13
likely to be rejected post-Daubert, but many trial courts still routinely
allow them to testify about syndromes and other unusual mental
14
states that are only weakly supported by data.
period immediately preceding Daubert, judges were not compelled by doctrine and
rarely undertook in practice to evaluate the asserted warrant to believe claims of
expertise directly, in the terms put forth by the practitioners of the claimed
expertise.” Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 4, at 24.
10
Professor Gottesman made this point in the converse, and somewhat
hyperbolically, when he stated, “[t]he Court’s opinion [in Daubert] read literally
would dictate the end of the receipt of psychiatric and psychological testimony in
federal courts.” Michael H. Gottesman, Symposium, Admissibility of Expert Testimony
after Daubert: The “Prestige” Factor, 43 EMORY L.J. 867, 875-76 (1994).
11
Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 4, at 64, 70.
12
Donald N. Bersoff et al., The Admissibility of Psychological Evidence Six Years After
Daubert: Floodgates or Gatekeeping?, paper presented at the biennial meeting of the
American Psychology-Law Society, New Orleans, La. (March 2000) (observing that
the proportion of cases in Daubert jurisdictions admitting expert evidence about such
subjects as mental disorders, syndromes, intent, dangerousness, and child sex abuse
victims either remained the same or increased in the first five years after that
decision as compared to the five years prior to Daubert).
13
See infra text accompanying notes 42-45 (describing rejection of expert
testimony about confessions and eyewitnesses); Jennifer L. Groscup & Steven D.
Penrod, Battle of the Standards for Experts in Criminal Cases: Police vs. Psychologists, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 1141, 1155 (2003)(in study of post-Daubert expert admissibility
decisions, “prosecution experts were admitted significantly more often than defense
proffered experts”).
14
See generally Bersoff, supra note 12. See also, S.A. Dobbin et al., Battered Woman
Syndrome and Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Case Law Analysis After Daubert, paper
presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, Redondo
Beach, Cal. (March 1998) (stating that courts determining the admissibility of
battered women and rape trauma syndrome evidence after 1993 “are not generally
engaging in scientific reviews of the proffered syndrome . . . . Most typically, the
focus is on general acceptance and the qualifications of the expert, and even then
the judicial review tends to be cursory.”) (on file with author); Ralph Slovenko, From
Frye to Daubert and Beyond, 28 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 411, 436 (2000)(“since Daubert
[behavioral and social science] evidence that would have been admitted prior to
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At the same time, the clear trend is toward more exclusion. In
his contribution to this Symposium, Paul Gianelli notes that the
Daubert trilogy has triggered attacks, some of them successful, on
handwriting evidence, hair comparisons, fingerprint examinations,
15
firearms identification, bite marks, and intoxication testing.
An
empirical study of criminal cases that was concluded in 1998 found
that, although there was only a marginally significant decline in the
proportion of expert evidence admitted, judges were clearly
16
scrutinizing such evidence more closely after Daubert. It is likely that
momentum in this direction will increase, now that Kumho Tire has
closed the “technical and specialized knowledge” loophole by
applying the reliability standard to that type of expertise as well as to
17
scientific testimony.
DAUBERT’S DISADVANTAGES FOR THE DEFENSE
Proponents of Daubert think that the trend toward screening is
all to the good and would like to see it accelerated. I am much more
ambivalent on this score, at least when considering criminal cases.
To explain why, I first want to establish the second proposition
mentioned above—that the move toward the scientific way of seeing
the world is much better for prosecutors than for criminal
defendants.
The preliminary reaction to this point is likely to be that it gets
things backward. Denbeaux and Risinger amply illustrate that
prosecutors stand to lose a significant amount of expert support if
Daubert is applied rigorously to testimony about handwriting,
18
fingerprints, and the like. Defense attorneys would also find many
of their experts excluded or limited under a strict Daubert regime, but
most might be willing to put up with that development if the
prosecution were prevented from presenting suspect forensic
Daubert has been excluded only in isolated cases, [and] overall Daubert has not
resulted in changes in the admissibility of that kind of evidence.”).
15
Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1071, 1096-97 (2003).
16
Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 339 (2002).
17
526 U.S. at 150-51; cf. Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for
Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL.,
PUB. POL’Y & L. 251, 269, 277 (2002) (finding that post-Daubert, “judges have
examined the reliability of expert evidence more closely and have found more
evidence unreliable as a result” and that “Kumho appears to have confirmed a trend
already under way in federal district courts to apply Daubert broadly rather than
restrict it to hard science”).
18
Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 4, at 60-74.
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evidence.
In the long run, however, the likelihood is high that criminal
defendants will suffer much more than the state if Daubert is taken
seriously. That is because prosecutors and defense attorneys need
different types of experts to make their cases-in-chief.
The
prosecution uses experts primarily to support assertions about
physical facts. It most often needs opinion evidence to prove identity,
as in testimony that ties a fingerprint, a strand of hair, or a signature
to the defendant, or a bullet to a particular gun. Occasionally, it also
19
uses experts to prove that a physical act occurred, such as abuse, or
20
will occur, as in dangerousness determinations.
In contrast, the defense’s affirmative case is most likely to involve
claims about the defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense,
such as insanity, lack of premeditation, extreme mental or emotional
stress, or learned helplessness. While the prosecution sometimes
21
bears the burden of proving mental states, the defense always bears
22
the burden of production on these issues. That is because most
factfinders assume, based on “common sense” notions that are often
23
legally recognized, that criminal defendants are sane, intend their
actions, and act in self-defense or under duress only when objective
circumstances would force a reasonable person to do so. The
prosecution only needs experts on mental state issues if and when the
19
See generally, Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and
Evidence Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 461, 470 (1996) (describing prosecutor use of child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome, which describes psychological characteristics and
conduct sometimes associated with abuse, and battered child syndrome, which
describes physical characteristics highly correlated with abuse).
20
See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (upholding, against
constitutional challenges, the admissibility of psychiatric testimony on dangerousness
in a capital sentencing proceeding).
21
In approximately one-third of the states the prosecution bears the burden of
disproving insanity, with the rest requiring the defendant to prove insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence. RALPH REISNER ET
AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 527-28 (3d ed.
1999). The prosecution often bears the burden of proving mens rea and disproving
self-defense claims, but not always. WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 54-59 (3d. ed.
2000) (discussing this complicated area and concluding that, to a large extent, “it
remains for each jurisdiction to decide how to allocate the burden of proof in
criminal cases as to so-called affirmative defenses”).
22
LAFAVE, supra note 21, at 54 (“[I]t is uniformly held that the defendant is
obliged to start matters off by putting in some evidence in support of his defense—
e.g., evidence of his insanity, or of his acting in self-defense, or of one of the other
affirmative defenses . . . .”).
23
Id. at 239-41 (stating that every jurisdiction recognizes a presumption of sanity
and juries are allowed to draw an inference that people intend the consequences of
their actions); id. at 375 (describing when “permissive inference” instructions
regarding mental state are constitutional).
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defense decides to use a mental health professional. Thus, it is up
to the defense to put mental health experts into play.
This difference in the type of experts the prosecution and
defense need for their prima facie cases becomes extremely
significant in a strict Daubert regime. That is because assertions about
physical facts are eminently more verifiable than assertions about past
mental state. As Denbeaux and Risinger demonstrate, testing the
hypothesis that a single fingerprint is enough to provide a match or
that a particular handwriting expert is proficient at identification is
25
relatively easy as science goes. The same cannot be said for research
on past mental state.
26
I have developed at length elsewhere why this is so. In brief,
the point is that mental states such as insanity, lack of premeditation,
extreme mental and emotional stress, and reasonable fear of harm
are closer to social constructions than objective facts. While a
scientist or technician can, at least in theory, tell us the extent to
which fingerprints match, only juries can tell us whether a defendant
premeditated, appreciated the wrongfulness of his or her actions, or
24
The prosecution does occasionally use experts to prove past mental state in
drug and possession cases. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 192 F.3d 580, 589 (1999)
(“‘Courts have overwhelmingly found police officers’ expert testimony admissible
where it will aid the jury’s understanding of an area, such as drug dealing, not within
the experience of the average juror.’”) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d
676, 682 (6th Cir. 1996)). The experts are usually police, not mental health
professionals, and the assertions made (e.g., that a person with a rolled up pants-leg
is a drug dealer) are generally much more susceptible to verification than the
assertions made by defense experts testifying about insanity and other defensive
doctrines. See Mark Hansen, Dr. Cop on the Stand, A.B.A. J., May 2002, at 31-32.
25
Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 4, at 60-64, 68-70; see also, David A. Stoney,
Fingerprint Identification: Scientific Status, in 3 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 394-95 (2002) (describing “realistic” methodological
models for measuring fingerprint identification expertise that are not “particularly
easy” but are “feasible” and will provide information about the reliability of
identification “when there is some minimal level of detail present in the
fingerprints”). The same can be said for other forensic techniques on which the
government relies. See, e.g., Alfred Biasotti & John Murdock, Firearms and Toolmark
Identification, in 3 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra, at 517 (“It is anticipated that objective
quantitative criteria for identification will eventually become widely accepted and
used because of the research already conducted and published . . . .”); Michael P.
Risinger, Handwriting Identification: Scientific Status, in 3 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra, at 481
(“Research can provide a warrant for believing that document examiners possess
sufficient skills in regard to particular tasks to warrant admission, at least under test
conditions.”).
26
See Christopher Slobogin, Doubts About Daubert: Psychiatric Anecdata as a Case
Study, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 919, 927-31 (2000) [hereinafter Slobogin, Doubts About
Daubert]; Christopher Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials: To Junk or Not
to Junk?, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 35-40 (1998) [hereinafter Slobogin, Psychiatric
Evidence in Criminal Trials].
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experienced irresistible urges or overwhelming fears. Further, even
if such constructions are somehow reducible to objective referents,
“scientific” measurement of their existence at the time of a criminal
offense is very difficult; the stability of intent, the depth of
appreciation, and the strength of urges and fears are not susceptible
28
to easy calibration even in the present, much less the past. Thomas
Grisso, who has spent most of his highly regarded career developing
and researching instruments designed to assess forensic psychological
issues, summarizes the two points just made as follows: “There is little
reason to believe that past meager advances in performing
evaluations for criminal responsibility will be augmented in the near
future,” both because the relevant “theoretical and operational
definitions are difficult to identify” and because “we have not yet
demonstrated our ability even to make . . . basic retrospective
inferences [about mental disorder at the time of the offense] reliably
29
and validly . . . .” In a strict Daubert regime, the typical defense
expert may be able to do little more than describe a criminal
defendant’s alleged thoughts and actions, and leave further
30
inferences to the factfinder.
A second, more subtle difference between prosecution and
defense expertise is that, on those occasions when verifiability is
possible, the latter type of expertise is more prone to lack “fit.”
Daubert and Kumho Tire have made the fit inquiry a fundamental
27

A behavioral scientist friend of mine who insists that we can study past mental
state scientifically put the point this way: past mental states “are hypothetical
constructs based on inferences drawn from multiple observed sources, sometimes of
tenuous relationship to the underlying construct, [rather than] a single observation
of a concrete, observable fact with an inevitable but often very small error rate
associated with the accuracy or validity of the observation.” Mark Fondacaro,
comments to author, January 14, 2003. Whether my take or his is more accurate,
both expose the difference between defense (past mental state) and prosecution
(physical fact) expertise.
28
See Alexander Rosenberg, The Explanation of Human Action, in PHILOSOPHY OF
SOCIAL SCIENCE 47-49 (1988) (describing why measuring “what a person believes by
some distinct effect of the belief, in the way that a thermometer measures heat by its
quite distinct effect . . . is impossible”).
29
Thomas Grisso, Pretrial Clinical Evaluations in Criminal Cases: Past Trends and
Future Directions, 23 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 90, 97-98 (1996).
30
Stephen Morse argues that this is all mental health professionals should be
allowed to say in court, because further inferences are unreliable and trench on the
legal factfinder’s job of making normative decisions. Stephen J. Morse, Crazy
Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527,
600-19 (1978). Professor Bonnie and I took issue with this position, see Richard J.
Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal
Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427 (1980), for reasons that
later parts of this Essay suggest and elaborate upon. See infra text accompanying
notes 55 to 77.
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31

aspect of admissibility analysis. The key issue here, as Denbeaux and
Risinger indicate, is “the reliability of the proffered expertise
specifically as it applies to the task for which it is being utilized in the
32
litigation in which it is offered, not in some more global sense.”
This reliability-for-a-specific-purpose test is likely to exclude more
defense expertise than prosecution expertise because, given the
greater ease with which they can be found in the real world or
simulated in the laboratory, physical facts can be investigated with
much more specificity than the usual types of claims defendants
make.
For instance, if investigators want to determine the accuracy of
fingerprint identification when there are only two partial prints or
only three match points, they can simply replicate those situations
using known individuals, in as many variations as they desire, and
ascertain the experts’ ability to match the prints with the full prints of
the sample. The same sort of procedure can be undertaken with
handwriting, ballistics and DNA analysis. In scientific terms, the
research can be carried out with objective criterion variables having
high external validity.
Scenarios useful to criminal defense experts, by contrast, are
much more difficult to arrange in the lab. This is most evident with
respect to mental states during criminal events. For obvious ethical
and legal reasons, these mental states cannot be reproduced
experimentally. More fundamentally, even if they could be, or are
discovered through ex post interviewing, these states are so varied in
content and process that obtaining “scientific” data about them that
are generalizable to legal proceedings is close to futile. As Daniel
Fishman notes about psychological states generally,
[i]n the individual case, be it the possibility of suicide, the
determination of which parent is better qualified in a custody
hearing, or the assessment of whether a criminal defendant is
innocent by reason of insanity, context and complexity dictate
against operationalizing a discrete outcome or collecting base
33
rates on similar types of situations.
31
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (“‘Fit’ is not always obvious, and scientific validity
for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.”);
id. at 597 (stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence “assign to the trial judge the
task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is
relevant to the task at hand”); see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 156 (“The trial court
ha[s] to decide whether this particular expert had sufficient specialized knowledge
to assist the jurors ‘in deciding the particular issues in the case.’”).
32
Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 4, at 30.
33
DANIEL B. FISHMAN, THE CASE FOR PRAGMATIC PSYCHOLOGY 210 (1999). Putting
this point another way, on those occasions when we can get “scientific” information
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The other two types of defense expertise mentioned above—
false confession and eyewitness testimony—can be almost as difficult
to bolster with task-specific research. Consider first false confessions.
Ideal research either would simulate the types of police techniques
hypothesized to cause such confessions (analogue research), or
would locate people who have confessed to a crime they did not
commit and then try to trace the factors that led to the confession
(validation research). Analogue research would have the most
potent external validity if it involved police use of
various
interrogation techniques, such as prolonged questioning, promises of
leniency, and deception about the strength of the evidence, in
situations where it was known the suspect did not commit the act
police want him to admit. But practical and ethical problems with
this type of research abound (e.g., making the interrogation “real”
for both police and suspects; concerns about subjecting innocent
individuals to coercion and deception). An alternative analogue
study might involve accusing subjects of something noncriminal and
subjecting them to lesser pressures; if false confessions occurred
under such circumstances, one might be able to draw conclusions
about the effects of police techniques. But the prosecution would
rightly point to the fact that the consequences of a false admission in
such noncriminal contexts do not approximate imprisonment and
34
thus make such admissions easier.
Validation research—i.e., finding people who have confessed
falsely and then classifying possible causal variables—is even more
35
difficult, because of the low base rate of false confessions and the
about past mental states, it is close to useless in an individual case. See, e.g., Slobogin,
Doubts About Daubert, supra note 26, at 928-31 & n.51. That does not mean we
cannot improve, in a systematic way, the evaluation of past mental states. See
FISHMAN, supra; Slobogin, infra note 66.
34
The only study of this type, conducted in 1996, involved seventy-five college
students who were given a typing test on a computer and told not to touch the “ALT”
key because it would crash the computer program and ruin the experiment. One
minute into the test the computer program crashed; although the crash was caused
by the experimenters, the subject was blamed. Using several modern interrogation
techniques, the research team was able to get 69% of the subjects to falsely confess to
causing the crash. But as Professor Kassin, the principal investigator, recognized, far
higher stakes are involved in a criminal investigation and, perhaps more importantly,
the facts were such that the subjects could have honestly believed they caused the
crash, as evidenced by the fact that over a third of the confessors stated they were
responsible after simply being asked “What happened?” Saul M. Kassin & Katherine
L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False Confessions: Compliance, Internalization, and
Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125 (1996).
35
Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost ConfessionsB
And from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 502 (1998) (estimating the
base rate for false confessions at between 1 in 2400 and 1 in 90,000).
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difficulty of determining when confessions are in fact false. Most
importantly for present purposes, even if it can be carried out,
neither it nor analogue research is likely to produce results that easily
fit a proposition in criminal adjudication. Rather, the findings are
likely to read something like, “The longer the interrogation, the
more likely a false confession will occur,” or “People who are
diagnosed as submissive based on personality testing are more likely
37
to give in to suggestions.”
Simulation of eyewitness situations is somewhat easier.
Researchers can subject experimental eyewitnesses to crime-relevant
scenarios, varying the race of the perpetrator, the presence of a
weapon, the length of the encounter, lighting and distance, and a
host of factors having to do with the nature of the identification
procedure (lineups, photo arrays, etc.). They can then gauge the
ability of the subjects to describe and identify the actual
38
perpetrators. For this reason, study of eyewitness accuracy tends to
39
be among the most reliable research, as far as it goes. But in the
end, it does not go very far. Similar to false confession research, all
that eyewitness research is likely to tell us is something comparative,
to wit: “All else being equal, an eyewitness who is confronted with a
gun is less likely to be accurate in identifying the perpetrator than
40
someone who was not confronted by a weapon.”
It should not be surprising that courts have tended to exclude
41
this type of testimony.
Sometimes the exclusion is explicitly on
42
unreliability grounds, but more commonly, consistent with the
foregoing comments, it results from a judicial determination that the
36
Compare Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) (claiming to have found sixty cases of false
confessions) with Cassell, supra note 35, at 587 (claiming that nine out of the twentynine cases reported by Leo and Ofshe that Cassell examined did not involve false
confessions).
37
See Welsh S. White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV.
2001 (1998) (summarizing the research in these terms).
38
See generally Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Scientific Status, in 2 FAIGMAN
ET AL., supra note 25, at 391-422.
39
See Steven D. Penrod et al., Expert Psychological Testimony on Eyewitness Reliability
Before and After Daubert: The State of the Law and the Science, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 229, 256
(1995) (concluding that eyewitness research meets the Daubert criteria).
40
See, e.g., Wells, supra note 38, at 404-07.
41
See Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment’s Lost Clause: Unearthing Compulsory
Process, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1325-43 (summarizing the courts’ hostility to
eyewitness and confession testimony).
42
See, e.g., United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1996) (eyewitness
testimony); United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 1995) (eyewitness testimony);
State v. MacDonald, 718 A.2d 195, 198 (Me. 1998) (false confessions).
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evidence is not helpful to the trier of fact because, given its general
nature, it is within the ken of the jury and will not help resolve the
43
particular issues in the case. The study of appellate court decisions
reported by Jennifer Groscup and Stephen Penrod in this Symposium
verifies this conclusion. It found that the type of behavioral science
expert most likely to be excluded by the courts was the experimental
psychologist (precisely the type of expert who testifies about
eyewitness and confession issues) and that the usual reason given for
44
the exclusion was the testimony’s failure to “assist” the factfinder.
45
These types of holdings, whether correct or not, will only increase if
courts dogmatically adhere to the Daubert trilogy’s focus on fit; trial
judges can tell themselves that, while the expert’s research is
interesting, it does very little to resolve whether this confession or this
eyewitness identification is false.
Another way to make these points, in Daubertian language, is to
say that useful error rates will be harder to ascertain for defense
expertise than for prosecution expertise. Error rate is one of the four

43

The following two cases are representative. With respect to false confession
research, consider State v. Free, 798 A.2d 83 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). “[S]ince
Dr. Kassin cannot identify the degree to which the presence of one or more of these
factors might cause a false confession, his opinions . . . would be of no assistance to
the jury. What the jury would be left with . . . was accurately categorized by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine as ‘nothing more than an assertion that false
confessions do occur.’”. Id. at 96. With respect to eyewitness testimony, consider
United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095 (7th Cir. 1999). “‘[E]xpert testimony regarding
the potential hazards of eyewitness identification—regardless of its reliability—will
not aid the jury because it addresses an issue of which the jury already generally is
aware, and it will not contribute to their understanding of the particular factual
issues posed.’” Id. at 1105 (quoting United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 971 (7th
Cir. 1992).
44
Groscup & Penrod, supra note 13, at 1153 (reporting a survey of appellate
cases finding that testimony from experimental psychologists was admitted in only
22.1% of the cases—compared to a 49.7% admission rate for clinical psychologists
and an 85.7% rate for police—and that the courts’ rationale for exclusion was usually
not unreliability but a conclusion that the “experimental psychologists did not assist
the trier of fact.”).
45
I think they are incorrect, because the testimony educates the jury in helpful
ways, a fact which some courts recognize. See, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d
321, 340 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[The eyewitness expert] attempted to provide information
that, if itself deemed credible, might cause the jury to evaluate [the eyewitness’s]
testimony in a different light.”); Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 774 (Ind. 2002)
(“[False confession] testimony would have assisted the jury regarding the psychology
of relevant aspects of police interrogation and the interrogation of mentally retarded
persons, topics outside common knowledge and experience.”). See generally D.
Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of Expertise for the PostKumho World, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 508, 515-26 (2000) (describing
“summarizational” and “translational” expertise which educates the jury about
general scientific and technical knowledge).
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factors identified in Daubert as indicia of reliability, and perhaps the
most important. Forensic labs can produce error rates for all sorts of
scenarios, for the reasons indicated earlier.
In contrast,
particularized error rates are much harder to generate in connection
with social science research because of the multiplicity of potential
variables that might explain criminal behavior or its perception.
Even with respect to eyewitness testimony, which is based on the most
sophisticated social science research canvassed here, useful error
rates are hard to come by. As Gary Wells, a prominent researcher in
this area has noted,
Unfortunately . . . effect size measures from [eyewitness]
experiments are not necessarily applicable to actual cases (even
when measured as standard deviation units), because experiments
tend to hold constant and ensure the independence of other
variables that could influence eyewitness accuracy. The result of
this is that most eyewitness experts are reluctant to make firm
47
statements regarding effect sizes.

And when experts demonstrate this reluctance, courts influenced by
fit considerations have been quite willing to find it grounds for
48
exclusion.
The dichotomy between prosecution and defense expertise
would be even greater under one interpretation of Daubert. Suppose
research shows that forensic investigators with a two-point match can
make a correct fingerprint identification only 20% of the time; in
other words, there is an 80% error rate in such situations. One can
make a good argument that, under Daubert, even this relatively high
error rate should not be a bar to admission, because the error rate
49
can be communicated to the jury, and the jury can act accordingly.
Only the failure to have the error rate handy would lead to exclusion.
The defense is much more likely to fail in this regard because of the
aforementioned methodological difficulties.
This latter comment suggests the final way Daubert hurts the
defense more than the prosecution. Research requires money. The
46

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
Wells, supra note 38, at 415.
48
See, e.g., State v. McClendon, 730 A.2d 1107, 1115 (Conn. 1999) (“Leippe did
refer to several areas of scientific inquiry concerning eyewitness identification, but . .
. admitted, in sum, that ‘we don’t always know what factors are influencing’ an
eyewitness. He conceded that a controversy existed in the area of the statistical
probability of false identification, the one kind of information inaccessible to the
average juror.”).
49
Michael Saks made this argument at this Symposium. Cf. Michael J. Saks, The
Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science (Especially Fingerprint Expert Testimony),
33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1167, 1169-70 (2003).
47
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state has more of it. Of course, the defense is always resourcedisadvantaged when it comes to expert testimony. But Daubert
exacerbates that disadvantage by putting a premium on verifiability,
rather than allowing anyone with credentials to testify.
The state not only has more money, but it is better equipped, in
an institutional sense, to use it. Prosecutors are much better at
sharing information than defense attorneys. That is partly because
the government is by its nature a more coherent entity than the
defense bar, but it is also because the state is better able to anticipate
the scientific issues that will arise and act accordingly. Indeed,
Daubert and Kumho Tire have already stimulated massive federal efforts
to validate the type of forensic expertise typically relied upon by the
50
prosecution.
There is no analogous criminal defense effort to
generate scientific research on past mental states, false confessions,
and eyewitnesses and, given the atomistic nature of defense work,
unlikely to be any. Further, any one attorney’s attempt to obtain
research for a particular case is likely to meet a hostile reception from
51
the courts, because it is so obviously motivated by litigation needs.
Professor Park notes that academic researchers have often come
to the aid of defense attorneys, and implies that they can
52
counterbalance the government’s advantage. But their resources
53
pale when compared to the government’s. More importantly for the
50

For example, in 2001, Congress appropriated over $12 million to the FBI for
scientific research on projects such as identification of latent fingerprints and
gunshot residue, and overall provided “the means to initiate over 47 new,
high-priority research and development projects, for a total of 93 active projects in
2002.” Steven T. Homeyer, The FBI Research Partnership Program, 5 FORENSIC SCI.
COMM. (Jan. 2003), at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/jan2003/homeyer.
htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2003). For 2002, the relevant congressional committee
recommended another $8 million over 2001’s appropriation (for a total of over $20
million). Id. There are at least ten government-sponsored “scientific working
groups” in areas such as DNA analysis, bloodstain pattern analysis, firearms and tool
marks identification, and drug analysis. Carol Henderson, presentation at panel on
Science after Kumho Tire: When is Science Really Science?, A.A.L.S. Meeting, Wash., D.C.
(Jan. 3, 2003) (on file with author).
51
The advisory committee notes to the revised Federal Rule of Evidence 702
indicate that courts often consider as a reliability-indicating factor the “nonjudicial
uses” to which the basis of expert testimony has been put, suggesting that if there are
no non-judicial uses, reliability is suspect. See also, Judge Kozinski’s opinion in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995) (“One very
significant fact to be considered is whether the experts are proposing to testify about
matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted
independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions
expressly for purposes of testifying.”).
52
Roger C. Park, Daubert on a Tilted Playing Field, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1113
(2003).
53
Between 1989 and 2002, the National Science Foundation dispensed roughly
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thesis of this Essay, their alliance with the defense might not survive
more rigorous application of Daubert. In contrast to the effect of
exclusion on prosecution experts, who often work for the
government, exclusion of academics’ testimony will not necessarily
work any change in research agenda, since neither the reputation
nor the livelihood of these professional scholars depends on the
54
courtroom.
DAUBERT’S POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO THE SYSTEM
These observations lead to the following question, which gets at
the third and final proposition I want to address: Assuming Daubert
has the differential impact on prosecution and defense expertise just
described, is it something we should worry about, or is it merely a
sensible consequence of focusing criminal cases on reliability? My
answer is that we should worry, because Daubert’s reliability test, if it
does lead to significant exclusion of defense evidence, will make the
system both less fair and less reliable.
As many commentators have pointed out, Daubertian reliability
is not the only objective of the criminal justice system. I have written
about the defendant’s entitlement to voice, derived in the first
instance from the Court’s due process jurisprudence establishing the
55
right to testify, but also from the idea that the criminal justice
system’s legitimacy is undermined when courts squelch the
56
defendant’s efforts to tell his or her story, however tenuous.
Professor Sanders, in his article for this Symposium, similarly alludes
to the procedural justice literature, which suggests that an important
component of adjudication, from society’s as well as the individual’s
$5 million to researchers investigating issues connected with insanity, confessions,
and eyewitnesses (the latter broadly construed to include issues concerning memory,
optimum identification procedures, and the ability of children to testify). See Nat’l
Sci. Found., FastLane, available at http://www.fastlane.nsf.gov/a6/A6AwardSearch.
htm (results on file with author) (using keywords “eyewitness & identification,”
“confessions” and “insanity”). Compare this figure to the more than $12 million the
federal government appropriated in one year for various forensic identification
research projects. See Homeyer, supra note 50.
54
This fact, together with the fact that defense attorneys are typically not “repeat
players” for these types of expertise, may mean that the hope that strict admissibility
standards will trigger different research will not be borne out in this context. Cf.
David L. Faigman, The Evidentiary Status of Social Science under Daubert: Is It “Scientific,”
“Technical,” or “Other” Knowledge?, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 960, 971-77 (1995)
(arguing that proper application of Daubert will stimulate better research).
55
Christopher Slobogin, The Admissibility of Behavioral Science Information in
Criminal Trials: From Primitivism to Daubert to Voice, 5 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 100,
113-17 (1999).
56
Id. at 117-19.
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perspective, is the perception that people have an opportunity to
57
make their point of view known. Professor Goldwasser has argued
that reliability-based exclusionary rules, when used against the
defendant, impair the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. That
right, she notes, is “founded on the notion that juries are likely to be
58
more protective of an accused than are judges” because, as a diverse
group of laypeople, they will more likely “be receptive to—or at least
give meaningful consideration to—the unusual, unexpected, or even
59
implausible stories criminal defendants sometimes bring to court.”
And Professor Hoeffel has forcefully contended that the Sixth
Amendment Compulsory Process Clause has been and should be
read to accord the criminal defendant the right to present all
60
material evidence. To interpret Daubert to require something more
than materiality, she contends, undermines the fair process goals of
rationality, predictability, and consistency, as judges futilely try to
implement an amorphous reliability threshold in a wide array of
61
contexts.
I will not rehearse these arguments any further here. They all
suggest that, whatever might be the case in the civil context out of
which the Daubert trilogy arose, in the criminal setting concerns about
process should trump concerns about reliability. But it should also
be recognized that reliability is not necessarily sacrificed when the
defense is permitted to use evidence that fails the positivist threshold
dictated by Daubert. There are at least three reasons for thinking so.
I have already suggested the first reason. When the expertise
addresses inferences about past mental state, we cannot know whether
the opinion is reliable in the Daubertian sense, and thus exclusion
may work a real harm to accuracy goals. As one court has stated,
“[l]egal tests of criminal insanity are not and cannot be the result of
62
scientific analysis or objective judgment.” The same might be said
about whether a person premeditated a crime or perceived a threat
57

Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the
Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881 (2003).
58
Katherine Goldwasser, Vindicating the Right to Trial by Jury and the Requirement of
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom About Excluding
Defense Evidence, 86 GEO. L.J. 621, 636 (1998).
59
Id. at 639.
60
Hoeffel, supra note 41, at 1352.
61
Id. at 1316-52 (using court decisions involving eyewitness, false confession, rape
trauma syndrome, and polygraph expertise as a basis for arguing that courts apply
Daubert inconsistently, and often with little attention to reliability concerns).
62
Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1945). The court
continued, “There is no objective standard by which such a judgment of an
admittedly abnormal offender can be measured.” Id.
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and believed the force used was necessary to combat it. Aside from
64
the malingerer (who can often be detected ), defendants who say
they suffered mental aberrations during the offense may well be
“right;” at least we have no scientific way of proving them wrong.
For this reason, the suggestion that expert opinion testimony
about mental state should be excluded unless it can be shown to be
“reliable” in the social science sense (i.e., consistent over evaluators)
65
would be inappropriate.
While disagreement between two
evaluators assessing the same individual does mean that one is wrong,
it does not mean that both are wrong. Because we cannot tell which
evaluator’s opinion is invalid simply from comparison data, and
because exclusion would deprive the defendant of voice, we should
err on the side of letting the testimony in. (At the same time, in an
effort to improve consistency, we can insist on assessment techniques
66
that consider, in a structured way, the legally relevant variables. )
The second reason the admission of “unscientific” evidence may
not undermine ultimate “reliability” (now returning to use of that
term to mean valid or accurate) relates to the typical heuristics of
legal decision makers. In cases where the defense makes claims
based on past mental state, false confessions, or mistaken
identification, the defendant is left with very little ammunition for
creating reasonable doubt if he or she is deprived of an expert. In
these cases the defendant is trying to overcome assumptions, legal or
otherwise, that are quite strong: that people who commit criminal
acts intend their actions, control them, and do not grossly
63
See Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 87 (D.C. 1976) (“The concept of mens
rea involves what is ultimately the fiction of determining the actual thoughts or
mental processes of the accused. It is obvious that a certain resolution of this issue is
beyond the ken of scientist and laymen alike.”) (internal citation omitted).
64
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 238-40 (1994)
(stating that advances in detection of malingering can discern faking in over 90% of
the cases when it does occur).
65
This proposition was put forward by David Faigman at this Symposium.
Actually, reliability studies have shown fairly good inter-rater agreement between
clinicians when gross dysfunction is the issue. See GARY B. MELTON ET AL.,
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 229-31 (2d ed. 1997) (summarizing studies that find
agreement rates on the issue of “insanity” of 64% to 97% between mental health
professionals and of 88% to 93% between mental health professionals and courts);
see also RICHARD ROGERS, R-CRAS MANUAL 13 (1984) (showing inter-rater agreement
of 87% for “loss of cognitive control” and 89% for “loss of behavioral control”).
Agreement on other types of issues is much lower, however. See Doubts About
Daubert, supra note 26, at 920-21.
66
I develop this last point in Christopher Slobogin, Pragmatic Forensic Psychology: A
Means of “Scientizing” Expert Testimony from Mental Health Professionals? 9 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y. & L. 275 (2003) [hereinafter Slobogin, Scientizing Expert Testimony].
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misperceive the surrounding circumstances; that people who are
innocent do not confess to crimes; and that eyewitnesses who are sure
about their identification do not get it wrong. Expert testimony
provides the decision maker with plausible reasons for challenging
those assumptions. Without the testimony, decisions are very likely to
be uninformed. Alternative explanations will never be heard, or will
never be considered because they are supported only by the
presumably self-serving statements of the defendant and the attorney.
The result could be truly unreliable decisions, not just with
respect to past mental state, the indeterminacy of which has already
been noted, but also in connection with false confession and
mistaken identification claims. It is well to remember that mistaken
identifications are the single most significant cause of wrongful
67
convictions, and that coerced confessions are not too far behind in
68
Furthermore, articulate defense experts can help
that category.
make up for the woefully inadequate representation often accorded
69
defendants, another cause of wrongful convictions.
Routine
exclusion of defense expertise could also have more subtle effects on
the accuracy of criminal adjudications: Knowing that their
interrogation and identification processes will not be meaningfully
challenged, prosecutors and police may be less careful in their
70
investigation, producing further risk of erroneous verdicts.
The final reason evidence that fails Daubert should not be of
tremendous concern in the criminal defense context is that criminal
judges and juries know what to do with it. As Professor Nance notes
67
BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000) (finding that eyewitness
identifications were involved in 84% of 63 definitive DNA-based exoneration cases in
the United States); Arye Rattner, Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the
Criminal Justice System, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283, 289-91 (1988) (stating that out of
205 erroneous conviction cases, eyewitness misidentifications were responsible for
48.8%, a greater proportion than all other causes, including perjury (26%), coerced
confessions (16%), and forensic science errors (3%)).
68
See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 36 (describing 60 cases in which they claimed false
confessions were obtained); Rattner, supra note 67, at 290 (finding coerced
confessions responsible for 16% of erroneous convictions).
69
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES,
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASES STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH
INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 15-18 (1996) (describing wrongful convictions attributable to
ineffective counsel).
70
Cf. Ellen Yankiver Suni, Who Stole the Cookie from the Cookie Jar?: The Law and
Ethics of Shifting Blame in Criminal Cases, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1690 (2000) (“If
police and prosecutors know that defendants have limited resources to investigate . .
., and that even if defendants obtain resources to do so, evidence that they find will
be unusable . . ., police and prosecutors will have little incentive to explore
alternative theories once they have reached a preliminary conclusion.”)
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in this Symposium, jurors are not credulous.
The research that
Professor Sanders believes calls for a paternalist stance toward jurors
at best suggests that they are confused by “complex” expertise
72
involving statistics; that type of testimony is rarely presented by the
defense in criminal cases. Professor Sanders also presents evidence
suggesting that jurors engage in peripheral, rather than central,
73
processing, even in non-complex cases. Even if that is so, it is not
clear that adjusting expert admissibility standards is the appropriate
response. Arguably, the proper prescription for any lay tendency to
pay too much attention to demeanor, amount of fee, credentials, and
other “non-central” factors is not a reliability threshold—even
reliable evidence will be ignored under the appropriate peripheral
conditions—but rather presentation of expert evidence in as bland a
manner as possible, perhaps through documents without identifying
the source. That, for better or worse, runs afoul of our adversarial
74
tradition in criminal cases.
Most research shows that juries do not attribute undue
significance to syndrome testimony, eyewitness testimony and the
like; if anything, such testimony is undervalued because of a pervasive
75
skepticism about social science claims. The one study described by
Sanders that found to the contrary involved prediction testimony by a
prosecution witness, which even strong cross-examination and an
76
opposing expert could not shake. That study does not suggest that
71

Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV.
191, 228 (2003).
72
Sanders, supra note 57, at 901-07.
73
Id. at 909-16.
74
Trial by document is prohibited by the Sixth Amendment’s right of
confrontation clause. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (requiring face-toface meeting with available witnesses).
75
A meta-review of jury research in “non-scientific” cases summarized the
findings this way: “It is clear that expert testimony is not accepted in a mindless
fashion by gullible jurors awed by flashy credentials. Rather, expert testimony is
scrutinized as intensively as the testimony of any other witness and even viewed
somewhat cynically.” Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical
Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 689 (2001); see also,
Charles Bleil, Evidence of Syndromes: No Need for a “Better Mousetrap,” 32 S. TEX. L. REV.
37, 66 (1990) (arguing that social science testimony is probably “the least over-awing”
of the various types of expert testimony “because jurors have some innate knowledge
of human behavior”); Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence:
Social Framework Testimony, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 173 (1989) (reporting
research indicating that jurors do not treat expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome, rape trauma syndrome and eyewitness reliability with an unwarranted
aura of accuracy).
76
Sanders, supra note 57, at 931-36 (describing Shari Seidman Diamond et al.,
Juror Reactions to Attorneys at Trial, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 17 (1996)).

2003

STRUCTURE OF EXPERTISE

123

defense witnesses need to be kept from the jury, but rather supports
the point made earlier that the state naturally benefits from
assumptions against defendants, so much so that defense evidence
77
rarely dents its case.
That is all the more reason to put as few
obstacles in the way of defense efforts to do so, if reliability of
outcome is really our ultimate goal.
In sum, admission of expert testimony on past mental state,
eyewitnesses, and interrogation will probably enhance reliability, even
if that testimony is of questionable validity or fit. Occasionally, a
person who commits a serious crime will be erroneously acquitted
because a jury, misled by expert testimony, mistakenly disbelieves a
confession or an eyewitness, or mistakenly sympathizes with a
psychopath asserting an insanity or diminished responsibility defense.
But note first that, in the latter cases, a win for the defense will still
78
usually result in incarceration, either in a hospital or prison.
Second, and most importantly, the small number of cases in which a
guilty person actually walks free because of “unreliable” defense
expertise will probably fall far below the number of cases in which it
saves an innocent person. In scientific terms, the number of false
positives such testimony prevents is likely to be greater than the
79
number of false negatives it causes. If so, the reasonable doubt
standard strongly suggests that the experts should be allowed to
testify.
CONCLUSION
Daubert and Kumho Tire, construed so as to require strong
verifiability and vigorous fit to the task at hand, will exacerbate the
imbalance between prosecution and defense that already exists.
Once it has adjusted to the more stringent standards, the state, with
its superior resources, its institutional incentives, and its focus on
77
Only when the government expert himself admitted he might be wrong two
out of three times did study subjects tend to change their minds. Diamond et al.,
supra note 76, at Table 4. The authors of the study themselves suggest that the
outcome they obtained was due to the concordance between the expert’s views and
the jurors preconceptions. Id. at 53.
78
Typically, people found not guilty by reason of insanity are hospitalized for at
least as long as those convicted of similar crimes spend in prison. See MELTON ET AL.,
supra note 65, at 188-89. Successful diminished responsibility defenses result in
conviction on the lesser included offense. Id. at 204-08.
79
Cf. R. Erik Lillquist, A Comment on the Admissibility of Forensic Evidence, 33 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1189 (2003) (arguing that differential standards that increase the
possibility of acquitting innocent defendants but that also increase the possibility of
acquitting guilty defendants is a bad tradeoff because there are so many more guilty
defendants).
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expertise that relies on observance of physical facts, will have no
problem producing admissible evidence, especially if the main
admissibility criterion is the existence of error rates, rather than the
existence of low ones. The defense, on the other hand, will struggle
to produce positivist-oriented expertise with sufficient external
validity because of the socially constructed nature of its claims, the
difficulty of simulating relevant scenarios, and the general
disorganization of the defense bar. The result will be a criminal
process that is unfair in appearance and in fact, and one that will
produce more unreliable results than one that is more generous
toward defense-produced expertise.
These considerations suggest that very few limitations should be
placed on defense expertise. There are at least three versions of a
relaxed reliability standard. Borrowing from the Supreme Court’s
80
language in Rock v. Arkansas, Professor Hoeffel would admit defense
expert evidence unless it is completely untrustworthy or is immune to
the traditional means of evaluating credibility, such as crossexamination, rebuttal witnesses, and jury instructions (in other
81
words, she prefers the relevance test of yore). I have suggested a
somewhat more demanding standard than Hoeffel’s, requiring that
when the defense expert relies on theory that has not been subjected
to verification it should at least be considered plausible among the
relevant professionals, and that when an expert renders an opinion
about a particular individual’s mental state, he or she should use
82
accepted evaluation protocols.
Also more demanding is the
standard proposed by Professor Nance, who would generally permit
any relevant expert evidence, but not if more reliable evidence is
“reasonably” available, a standard he believes is necessary to
83
encourage further, better research.
Each proposal can be attacked, even if we assume a relaxed
approach is advisable. Hoeffel’s test will strike some as a nonstandard; it might exclude astrology as completely untrustworthy, but
80

483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987).
Hoeffel, supra note 41, at 1352.
82
Unfortunately, this standard can only be gleaned by looking at a number of my
writings. Slobogin, Doubts about Daubert, supra note 26, at 944-47; Slobogin,
Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials, supra note 26, at 41; Slobogin, Scientizing Expert
Testimony, supra note 65, at 302-06. The second article also makes a distinction
between past mental state evidence and evidence designed to show an act did (or did
not) occur. The latter evidence, I argued, should only be admissible if it meets a
Daubertian verifiability standard, whether presented by the prosecution or the
defense. Thus, eyewitness testimony would have to meet the latter standard, which I
think it does. See supra note 45.
83
Nance, supra note 71, at 228-30.
81
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it would let in virtually all defense testimony from behavioral
scientists, regardless of how “soft” it is. My proposal suffers from the
84
same problems that afflict Frye’s general acceptance test. It can be
difficult determining how many professionals, in what field, have to
accept a theory or protocol, as well as precisely what has to be
accepted as plausible, and to what extent. Nance’s willingness to
exclude evidence when more reliable evidence is “reasonably
available” presents similar problems. Determining relative reliability,
especially with respect to past mental state expertise, can be quite
85
difficult. Moreover, better evidence is always possible to generate, at
least in theory, and thus could be said to be “available,” yet, for
reasons suggested earlier, the defense bar is ill-equipped
institutionally to carry it out, making a determination of when such
research might be “reasonably” available a guessing game. Perhaps
Hoeffel’s standard, if modified to permit exclusion when better
research or protocols clearly already exist, best blends the notions
underlying all three proposals, while retaining clarity. Whatever the
standard, it should ensure that defense expertise is not subject to a
rigorous Daubert test.
Again, it would not be inconsistent with this position to require
that identification expertise offered by the prosecution satisfy the
86
latter test.
For reasons already described, prosecution expert
84

See generally Giannelli, supra note 7, at 1208-23.
Consider recent debates over whether testimony about past mental state based
on the results of the Rorschach test is as “reliable” as other approaches. See Barry
Ritzler et al., Protecting the Integrity of Rorschach Expert Witnesses: A Reply to Grove and
Barden (1999) Re: The Admissibility of Testimony Under Daubert/Kumho Analyses, 8
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 201 (2002); see also William M. Grove et al., Failure of
Rorschach-Comprehensive-System-Based Testimony to be Admissible Under the Daubert-JoinerKumho Standard, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 216 (2002); Barry Ritzler et al., A Final
Reply to Grove and Barden, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 235 (2002). See generally Edward
J. Imwinkelreid, The Relativity of Reliability, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 269 (2003)
(arguing that, under Nance’s approach, “the lack of a definition of reliability is a
major flaw in the proposal” and that “administration of this rule during a jury trial
will necessitate either horrendously long sidebar conferences or prolonged
recesses”).
86
Professor Park argues that an “asymmetrical” approach to Daubert would create
dissonance outside the courtroom (because the public will not be able to understand
why the defense can use evidence the prosecution cannot) as well as inside the
courtroom (because, if the defendant decides to use particular questionable types of
evidence, it can be difficult figuring out how much the prosecution may respond in
kind). Park, supra note 52, at 1116-17. He also suggests that loosened evidentiary
standards will come back to haunt the defense because the system will make up for
this advantage by shifting burdens, enhancing penalties and so on. Id. at 1123. The
regime that I advocate would not be directly asymmetrical, in that the government, as
well as the defense, would be the beneficiary of laxer reliability and fit rules when the
expert testimony concerns past mental state, eyewitness, and confession testimony;
85
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evidence tends to be easier to verify, better funded, less favored
under constitutional doctrine, more prone to feed jury
preconceptions, and more likely to cause dramatic harm if
erroneous. Daubert, a decision meant to make adjudication more
reliable, will not do so if reliability is the only factor courts consider
in making admissibility decisions. Structural differences between
criminal defense expertise and other types of expertise dictate that
Daubert be read flexibly.

only forensic identification and similar types of government expertise would be
subject to stricter standards. In this regime, Park’s concerns may dissipate. To the
extent they do not, they are no different than the concerns that are routinely
associated with constitutionally-mandated adversarial advantages, ranging from the
exclusion of evidence to the reasonable doubt standard itself. Presumably Professor
Park would not eliminate these latter advantages simply because the public may not
understand them, courts have trouble implementing them, or the system adjusts in
various ways to their impact. These types of speculative harms do not outweigh the
clear harm that would occur if, because of a rigid application of Daubert, criminal
defendants are no longer able to tell their exculpatory or mitigating stories through
experts.

